Projet Qualité Quality Project
|
ACTIVITY REPORT
QUALITY PROJECT
YEAR 2001 |
IMPROVING HUMANITARIAN PRACTICE:
FROM CAPITALISATION TO THE TRAINING OF AID WORKERS.
CASE STUDY: THE NATURAL DISASTERS IN CENTRAL AMERICA
Partners :
Action Contre la Faim
Aide Médicale Internationale
Bioforce
Care France
Coordination SUD
Croix Rouge Française
Handicap International
Médecins du Monde
Première Urgence
Solidarités
Architecture et Développement
Technical Co-ordination :
Groupe URD
Address :
La Fontaine des Marins
26170 Plaisians – France
Tél./Fax. : 04 75 28 29 35
e-mail :
urd@urd.org
Project supported in 2001 by :The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Fondation de France, the Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
In 2002 and 2003, acceptation to be confirmed :The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ECHO, the Fondation de France, Ministère Suisse des Affaires Etrangères.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.3. The mobilised resources and the team
ACTIVITIESInventory of existing quality processes in emergency medical NGOs
Inventory of existing evaluation practices
Review of other projects concerning quality
Iterative missions with mini-seminars
Implementation of Iterative Evaluations with Mini-Seminars (IEMS) in Central America
2.2. Upstream and downstream of the research activities :
FUTURE OUTLOOKS CONCLUSION2.2.1. Organisation and chairing of meetings :
2.2.2. Writing, dissemination and publication :
Perception of the quality issue, and inventory of the quality processes carried out by French health NGOs, who are partners of the Quality Project.
Evaluations in unstable situations
ITERATIVE EVALUATIONS WITH MINI-SEMINARS, THE CASE OF EL SALVADOR AFTER THE 2001 EARTHQUAKES, SUMMARY OF THE FIRST MISSION REPORT
ITERATIVE EVALUATIONS WITH MINI-SEMINARS, MITCH + 3 YEARS, EL SALVADOR AFTER THE 2001 EARTHQUAKES, SUMMARY OF THE 2ND MISSION REPORT
The Quality Project was initiated and is supported by a dozen NGOs; it is carried out by Groupe URD. Its goal is to improve the quality of humanitarian interventions, by elaborating methods and evaluation tools to be used in each phase of an intervention: from the initial assessment, the project elaboration, the implementation and monitoring, to the evaluation.
It is a thorough process of quality evaluation, which carefully examines, for a given humanitarian intervention, the key points of the multiple processes which constitute the intervention.
2001 was the first year of the project ("year 0"), and thus served to establish the basis for future developments. A first series of results, which are presented in detail below, already appear. The Project must pursue its research in the next two years in order to reach concrete recommendations concerning the intervention process and/or tools for action, by the end of 2003.
For the "year 0", different sources of funding were mobilised:
|
Sources |
French MFA |
Swiss MFA |
Fondation de France |
Private funds URD |
Other sources |
Total |
|
Action |
Capitalisation on natural disasters C.A. |
Evaluation Salvador earthquake |
Global |
Global |
Global |
|
|
Total |
405.000 FF |
128.000 FF |
100.000 FF |
115.780 FF |
78.220 FF |
827.000 FF |
|
Percentage |
49% |
15% |
12% |
14% |
10% |
100% |
1.3. The mobilised resources and the team
These different funds have made it possible to make progress in the project. A team of 4 people (François Grünewald, Claire Pirotte, Eric Levron, Véronique de Geoffroy) is mobilised: they constitute the project-team. This team brings together different levels and types of qualifications (agronomy, medicine, urban development, International Humanitarian Law) and is occasionally assisted by expert consultants (e.g. for the first mission in El Salvador) or by interns (5) who cover specific issues under the team's supervision.
Two members of Groupe URD assisted the project team for the administrative and financial tasks of the Quality Project, as well as for communication activities, in particular through the creation of a Quality Project web page on Groupe URD's website.
This first year has made it possible to begin answering the following questions:
To this end, several levels of activities have been carried out throughout the year:
The theoretical work has essentially focused on making an inventory of existing practices and initiatives concerning the quality of humanitarian interventions. The objective of this process was to know what already exists so as to avoid repeating or overlapping with current activities. It was found, actually, that the sharing of NGOs' internal practices had not been done and that it could be an interesting exercise per se.
Inventory of existing quality processes in emergency medical NGOs
Groupe URD turned to Marion PORTAT, a health audit professional and a student at the Institute of Economic and Social Development Studies (IEDES), Paris-Sorbonne. She carried out a 5 month internship, in partnership with the French Red Cross, a member of the Quality Project.
The project-team supervised the preparatory and methodological work (elaboration of the questionnaire frame, selection of NGOs, personal contacts, etc.). Marion then collected the information and wrote a dissertation on this subject, which included a first level of conclusions and remarks. She went on a mission in Anjouan with Aide Médicale Internationale, another partner of the Quality Project, in order to include a field perspective in her study. Her work is currently being reviewed by the project-team in order to finalise the analysis and disseminate the results. A synthesis is presented in annexe 1.
Inventory of existing evaluation practices
This subject was studied by Morgane LE GUENIC, a student finishing her DESS on "Evaluation of Industrial, Agricultural, Social and Environmental Projects", at the University of Economics in Rennes. She undertook this research with Groupe URD during a 5 month internship. Using the same modus operandi as Marion, she interviewed around ten humanitarian or development organisations (not only medical) and wrote a summary document presenting a first level of conclusions. Of these, the need to combine the evaluation knowledge of emergency and development actors stands out. This point will be further developed in the future. A summary of her work is presented in annexe 2.
Review of other projects concerning quality
The issue of quality is today at the heart of the aid community's concerns, from donors to actors in the field; it can therefore be approached in different ways. By following the international debates on this issue, the Quality Project is by and by defining more clearly where it stands.
The following figure suggests a "miniature mapping" of the different existing initiatives.
Among this set of initiatives, the Quality Project positions itself at two levels:

Iterative missions with mini-seminars
The method of iterative evaluations with mini-seminars -a method which was conceived and tested through the Quality Project- is based on the two following hypotheses:
Evolution of the impact over time:
In this example:
At T1, the results are very positive (essential needs met)
At T2, the results can already appear less positive (aid dependency, project unsustainable, unplanned side-effects?)
At T3, according to each case, the integrated impact can be negative or positive
Implementation of Iterative Evaluations with Mini-Seminars (IEMS) in Central America
Following the work started in 1998 on the capitalisation of experiences after Hurricane Mitch, Groupe URD suggested Central America be taken as a case study for the implementation of the IEMS method, within the framework of the Quality Project. The earthquakes in El Salvador, at the beginning of the year, made this capitalisation and consultation process even more pertinent. A series of missions was thus undertaken throughout the year 2001 in different Central American countries that were affected by natural disasters.
Mission n°1 in El Salvador
In June 2001, 4 months after the earthquakes, a team of 3 people went to El Salvador during 3 weeks. They visited projects, and talked to victims, aid workers, etc., in order to take a "snapshot" of the situation and programme issues at stake, and to propose an analysis, in real time, to the national and international actors. This analysis, which was presented and discussed during a mini-seminar in San Salvador, is exposed in detail in the mission report (available on the web); a summary is presented in annexe 3.
Mission Mitch + 3 years in Nicaragua and Honduras
At the beginning of September, a team of 3 people went to Nicaragua and Honduras to visit post-Mitch reconstruction projects and evaluate their impact (beyond the planned effects of programmes). This mission had two objectives: 1) to continue the capitalisation of experiences by adding to it a mid-to-long term perspective; 2) to assist actors of the reconstruction in El Salvador by sharing with them the lessons learned from the post-Mitch reconstruction. (A summary of this mission is presented in annexe 4.)
Mission n°2 Salvador
At the end of September, the latter team thus went to El Salvador, after Honduras and Nicaragua. This second mission in El Salvador, 8 months after the earthquakes, had two principal objectives: 1) to discuss with the different actors the evolution of the programmes and issues related to the reconstruction; and 2) to give immediate feedback of the first conclusions of the mission Mitch + 3 years. This called for new field visits and for the organisation of a second mini-seminar in the UNDP offices in San Salvador. (The summary is included in annexe 4.)
In-depth case studies in Central America
Three junior researchers were mobilised in the field for specific tasks which completed the work done by the project-team.
Non-governmental co-operation and decentralised co-operation in Nicaragua
Javier Calderon, a student at the IEDES, did his internship under a tri-partite agreement between the University of Paris-Sorbonne, Groupe URD and the Fons Catala, a decentralised Catalan co-operation fund. Through surveys (with beneficiaries, local authorities, and co-operation workers) in 4 zones of Nicaragua (Somoto, Esteli, Posoltega, Cuidad Sandino) during 6 months, he analysed the different strategies used and their respective impacts. His university dissertation is available on demand from Groupe URD, and a summary will be prepared and disseminated in the coming weeks.
Mini social audit, "the voice of beneficiaries" in El Salvador
Karla Levy, a Venezuelan student from the University of Paris-Créteil, doing a DESS in management of humanitarian aid and NGOs, is doing her end-of-study project in El Salvador with Groupe URD; she is carrying out a "mini social audit". The objective of this work is to apprehend the perception beneficiaries have of the aid brought by the different actors, following the earthquakes (relevance, speed, usefulness, mode of delivery, etc.). The study is underway, and the results will be communicated shortly.
Partnership in crisis situations, a tool for quality?
Gabrielle Savy, a student from the University of Paris-Créteil, doing a DESS on management of humanitarian aid and NGOs, is carrying out her end-of-study project in El Salvador, in partnership with ATLAS, and under the supervision of Groupe URD. Her study topic is the partnership between ATLAS, an international emergency NGO, FUNDESYRAM, a Salvadorian development NGO, and Horizonte 3000, an Austrian donor. The objective of this study is to determine what is the added value of this partnership at the different levels of the programme (conception, choice of beneficiaries, socio-economic and cultural understanding, implementation, technical choices, etc.). But it also aims to identify the critical elements of this partnership (contractualisation, distribution of tasks and responsibilities, issue of public image, role of the donor, etc.). The study is underway and the results will be disseminated shortly.
2.2. Upstream and downstream of the research activities :
These various research activities have been accompanied by a series of complementary actions, which are also relevant to the Quality of humanitarian interventions. Upstream activities include the co-ordination of a network of actors who are mobilised around the project and the preparation of missions. Downstream activities involve the distribution of intermediary results and the dissemination of the approach in the international network.
2.2.1. Organisation and chairing of meetings :
Though Groupe URD is responsible for executing and implementing the Project, the Quality Project is inter-organisational and brings together a dozen partner NGOs. This group of NGOs has met twice this year to debate and validate the proposed process, and to discuss the intermediary results. The reports of these meetings are available on Groupe URD's web site.
2.2.2. Writing, dissemination and publication :
Given the different research activities have led to the writing of several documents (summary sheets, reports, minutes, etc.), a web page was created on Groupe URD's web site (
www.urd.org); it is regularly updated. It has been noted that this page is frequently visited by people from various regions of the world and by various types of institutions (universities, NGOs, UN agencies, etc.).Furthermore, particular attention is given to the dissemination of the approach and intermediary results beyond the French borders, to avoid limiting the project to a purely Franco-French analysis. All the reports on missions in Central America are available in Spanish, and part of the documents regarding the Quality Project are translated in English.
Moreover, Groupe URD has contributed two articles on the subject in specialised publications:
2.2.3. Participation in conferences and seminars :
The project team was invited to speak in several international events on the Quality of humanitarian action. This participation represents both the first results of the Project and the preliminary steps which are necessary for its implementation.
Though the training activities will be fully developed only in the final stage of the project, once the methods and tools will have been validated, a module introducing the debate on the quality of humanitarian assistance was conceived and tested, notably with interns from BIOFORCE. This module presents the terms of the present debate on the subject, as well as the foundations and first results of the Quality Project.
A training module on the set of work done in Central America, which includes a case study on "Mitch", is available; it will be presented in November 2001 to the students of the multi-faculty diploma of the University of Geneva ("development in high constraints zones").
The issue of quality of humanitarian action has started to concern more than the circles specialised on the subject, and it must be approachable by other publics. Groupe URD has therefore participated in the events around World Food Day in October 2001, in particular by chairing a debate on "the quality of food aid".
3. FUTURE OUTLOOKS
The Quality Project is presently awaiting funding. Applications for funding have been deposited with the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MCNG), with ECHO (on the "studies and research" budget line), and with the Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the partner NGOs have committed themselves to contribute to the budget.
The years 2002 and 2003 will constitute the 2 years of intense research for the project, with theoretical and practical work. The outcome should be a proposition of methods and concrete tools for action (c.f. project document).
In the short term, the activities which are currently being prepared are the following:
In the medium term, the theoretical work will continue, notably the research on the history of quality processes in other domains (services, or the productive private sector).
A certain number of existing methods used by some NGOs that seem particularly relevant, such as the International Rescue Committee's "Guide for programming, conception, monitoring and evaluation" -a novel method for team writing of field programmes and mid-term projections, will be tested.
Contextual studies on different types of crises will be carried out, as planned in the project document.
Finally, tools will gradually be developed, and tested in the field, such as the "questionnaire on key elements". This questionnaire came out of the analysis of "the most common and most serious errors" observed in the field, which was transformed in a list of key questions to ask when elaborating and monitoring a programme.
4. CONCLUSION
The debate on quality used to be, a few years ago, exclusively focused on technical indicators. Today, it has become much larger and richer. The issues surrounding the responsibility of the various actors -including donors- in programme implementation are now taken into consideration. The question of the measurement of programmes' impact, and not only that of objective achievement, is addressed. These topics make tackling the issue of quality definitely more complex, but also, and essentially, they bring the approach closer to the reality of situations.
This evolution of the debate at the international level was recognised, in the last ALNAP meeting in Washington, to be the result of 3 years of mobilisation by the French NGOs, through the Quality Project. Today, Groupe URD is strongly committed to pursuing its research work with the Quality Project's partner NGOs, in order to define, in the near future, methods and tools to improve the quality of humanitarian interventions.
Perception of the quality issue, and inventory of the quality processes carried out by French health NGOs, who are partners of the Quality Project.
Junior researcher in charge:
Marion PORTAT, student at the Institute for Economic and Social Development Studies, University of Paris-Sorbonne.Supervisor: Dr. Claire PIROTTE, Groupe URD
Resources:
Office and equipment made available by the French Red Cross
Field study in Anjouan (Comoro Islands), on an Aide Médicale Internationale mission
Living allowance paid by Groupe URD
Length of internship: from June to October 2001.
Methods used:
Results:
Conclusions :
A basis for quality processes exists in nearly all the NGOs met, even if these processes are not always formalised.
Among small NGOs, the perception of the quality issue varies considerably according to individual profiles (job, type of programme, etc.) and remains divided by sector (drug quality, justification of accounts…).
The bigger NGOs have a more global approach, which is based on the principle that the quality process should be transversal.
Each NGO has an internal discussion on how to improve tools and methods, but each focuses on very different actors, and with different objectives: donors, to justify one's credibility; other NGOs, to continue existing; the beneficiary population, to take on one's responsibilities… These considerations lead to the implementation of actions to improve quality, but they are not followed by internal evaluations, an indispensable phase for the improvement of quality.
The notion of quality in humanitarian organisations is based on the objectives and on the actors the NGOs target through their programmes. An NGO that focuses heavily on the principle of accountability will not follow the same approach as an organisation that emphasises action only. It seems certain, nevertheless, that neither of the two will have "good quality" programmes. The first one will not satisfy its beneficiaries, while the second, even if its actions are relevant and efficient, will not survive long without the financial support of donors.
As for the actors involved, it is important, when implementing a quality process, to carefully define the beneficiaries. For example, on the AMI mission in the Comoro Islands, the programme's objective was apparently to improve the population's access to health care; however, the activities focused on improving the running of the hospital and on training the hospital staff, without this systematically having direct consequences on the population.
Rather than answering to the "initial humanitarian disorder" observed on certain programmes through a liberal analysis that imposes the application of supposed universal norms, which are not adaptable to all contexts, it seems interesting to propose a systemic analysis corresponding to a regulated system. Thus the following elements could be taken into consideration, with more or less weight according to the context and nature of the crisis: the donor constraints, the needs of beneficiaries, the political will of NGOs and the donors' preferences.
The tools that would be used, regardless of their form, would be supports for discussion, training, capitalisation, organisation, etc. They should be specific to each NGO, according to its objectives and constraints. Each organisation would then put into place quality processes within its own structure. A common document would then be elaborated based on each one's experience. This common document could be a manual for reflection on the "tools and the quality process" implemented in each organisation (for example, on responses to emergency situations, on project implementation, on the training of expatriates) with questions (e.g. "is there a security policy?") which would be answered differently according to the context. Questions such as "how is security ensured on missions?" could complete this manual with answers which would be variable according to the NGOs in their headquarters (organisation of the purchasing department) or to the contexts in the field (modality for food distribution).
Evaluations in unstable situations
Junior researcher in charge: Morgane LE GUENIC, student at the University of Economics of Rennes I, DESS "Evaluation of industrial, agricultural, social and environmental projects".
Supervisors : François GRUNEWALD and Dr. Claire PIROTTE, Groupe URD
Resources:
Offices and living allowance from Groupe URD
Length of internship : from June to October 2001.
Methods used:
Results :
Conclusions :
Evaluations are increasingly common in the work of humanitarian actors, but they still present gaps compared to the evaluation processes used in other sectors.
Evaluations are not systematically carried out, despite the fact that, as a learning tool, they are particularly beneficial for organisations: their objective is indeed "to evaluate in order to evolve".
Furthermore, an evaluation is not always planned in the design of the project, which makes the evaluators' task more difficult. In this case, if the person in charge of the project is not informed beforehand of the coming of the consultant(s), s/he may be reticent to assist with the evaluation process, a process already made difficult by the fact that the financial resources and the time needed for its proper implementation could not be anticipated.
Moreover, an evaluation can represent a "breaking point" in the concerned project. It is therefore important to deploy all the means needed to carry out the evaluation without disturbing or interrupting the field workers' activities.
There is a lack of consensus, among the aid community, on the definition of key concepts concerning evaluation, a term which itself carries several meanings. Evaluation, impact, etc. can all have slightly different meanings, according to the consultants who use them. This prevents comparative analyses of evaluation reports from being done, and hinders the learning process.
Finally, there is often a lack of co-ordination, collaboration and information sharing between actors, such that the conclusions of an evaluative mission can be uncertain and imprecise.
It is advisable to clarify the definitions of the terms used in evaluation processes. It would be most productive, for emergency and development workers as a whole, to speak a common language, to reinforce the co-ordination and collaboration between the various actors in the field, and to facilitate the sharing of information, knowledge and skills. This would greatly improve their access to all the information they need.
Emergency and development aid workers -whose activities the last decade has shown us to be increasingly interconnected- would benefit greatly from sharing their knowledge on evaluation processes; this would help to improve and reinforce their evaluation methodology and, thereby, the quality of their programmes. The Participatory Approach tools, and especially the participatory evaluation method, which are widely used in the development world, would certainly be very useful -with certain adaptations- for emergency aid workers.
In various interviews, two additional points concerning the Quality Project stand out:
The actors all wish to reinforce their methodology for qualitative evaluations, in order to integrate the point-of-view of their beneficiaries, who are the ones able to validate the pertinence of the action. This approach must use precise and rigorous techniques (which still need to be developed) in order to be productive, otherwise the results and their interpretations would not be reliable. It is important to convince the decision-makers that qualitative evaluation is an innovative approach worth investing in.
It is therefore essential to reflect on the definition of evaluation criteria, which would not be solely technical, and which would take into consideration the specifics of a context and population. It must be noted that the lack of data and information is a recurrent factor, and that the pertinence of an evaluation mission can be limited if the consultant does not have good qualitative knowledge of the environment in which he is operating. Furthermore, it is crucial to place an action in its context: a quantitative evaluation, when isolated, cannot cover all the aspects that deserve to be addressed when dealing with quality. A quantitative evaluation used on its own, can only lead to approximate conclusions. In order to represent reality and the complexity of the field situation accurately, it is crucial to combine these two approaches.
ITERATIVE EVALUATIONS WITH MINI-SEMINARS, THE CASE OF EL SALVADOR AFTER THE 2001 EARTHQUAKES, SUMMARY OF THE FIRST MISSION REPORT
The method of iterative evaluations with mini-seminars was tested, as a part of the Quality Project, with the case of El Salvador, after the earthquakes at the beginning of 2001.
In this context, the multidisciplinary team went to the field from the 4th to the 30th June 2001.
The team met a panel of actors, which was as large and as representative as possible (government, aid organisations, international organisations, Salvadorian NGOs), as well as beneficiaries in 8 provinces of El Salvador. The data collection was done through formal interviews, discussions, literature reviews, and was punctuated with times of analysis and feedback to non-governmental officials in San Salvador. A first mini-seminar was thus organised in the field straight after the data collection, followed by another seminar upon the mission's return in Europe. The report, in French and Spanish, was made available for the actors in El Salvador and Europe in the weeks following the mission's return.
In order to tackle the questions thoroughly, the discussion was structured around three large technical sectors and 4 transversal issues. Shelter, health, and food security were chosen as technical sectors because they are closely linked to the basic needs of the population, and because they cover the various areas of intervention of NGOs in the field. The transversal issues were retained as elements that are essential to the pertinence and sustainability of projects in the Salvadorian context.
The analysis was thus structured around the double entry table presented below, which crosses the technical sectors and the transversal issues
|
TECHNICAL SECTORS
TRANSVERSAL ISSUES |
HEALTH |
FOOD AND ECONOMIC SECURITY |
SHELTER |
|
Transition from free services to cost recovery |
|||
|
Co-ordination and community participation |
|||
|
Population movements |
|||
|
Disaster prevention |
2. GENERAL CONTEXT
El Salvador has been in a state of chronic crisis for decades. This situation prevents any new, more equitable and sustainable, development strategies to be initiated for the moment. El Salvador is under the control of large international institutions, such as the IDB (Inter-American Development Bank), which offer loans without special conditions and impose a model of development based on the triad: "decentralisation, participation and privatisation". The successive governments have led a neo-liberal policy favouring the most "competitive" sectors and actors in the country. For example, each governmental development institution, such as the FISDL or the FODES, supports the towns with the highest potential. As for the poorer communities, they find themselves with the responsibility of managing their own development, without receiving any particular support. The question of access to basic services was already alarming before the earthquakes. Yet it is an indispensable prerequisite for access to citizenship. The successive privatisation of certain services have caused heavy price increases (up to +300%), thus excluding an even more important part of the population.
The civil society is mobilised on the political scene through various NGOs and foundations. The latter also carry out projects with the most vulnerable communities, though they have the feeling of not being able to achieve much, compared to the scope of the needs. Faced with the government's policy, they feel powerless.
After the tropical storm Mitch, which had partially but deeply affected El Salvador, the country was hit by two earthquakes of high magnitude, over a period of 30 days, at the beginning of the year 2001. The numerous tremors recorded throughout the first semester of the year have had two major consequences: the destruction of a third of the housing, and a disruption of the psycho-social order, which was already precarious.
This "socio-natural" disaster, is above all a rural phenomenon, since the majority of the damage occurred in rural, often very remote, areas. The earthquakes revealed the precariousness and vulnerability of a world suddenly made visible. In a context of commercial and economic liberalisation, the gap and the inequalities between the urban and rural worlds, between people having a real access to citizenship and those excluded from all basic services, were made even more apparent.
Faced with the disaster, the government's approach was to bank on continuity. The earthquakes were perceived as simple natural disasters, which were temporarily upsetting the smooth-going development process. There was therefore no question of raising doubts about the paradigms that dictated the country's policy, and even less of considering social and economic vulnerability as a major cause of the destruction engendered by the earthquakes. In official declarations, the international community was nevertheless presented with a series of good intentions: satisfaction of the population's most immediate needs, supply of basic services, support to small and medium businesses, etc. But in practice, competitiveness criteria prevail over the reduction of inequalities; aid is distributed along partisan lines; and economic development is based on "economic centres", which are essentially composed of maquilas (types of free zones, for textile in particular). This makes El Salvador a reservoir of cheap labour for multinational corporations. The civil society remains marginalized, as proved by the absence of Salvadorian forums during the meeting of the Consultative Group in Madrid in March 2001, where the debate focused on the sums of money the government could collect.
3. THE MOBILISATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AFTER THE EARTHQUAKES
International bilateral aid was rapidly mobilised. With much publicity, more or less impressive sums were announced for El Salvador. These generally do not represent much since the sums are calculated as loans, as expert consultations, as reduction of interest rates on debt, etc. The debates in the Legislative Assembly today focus more on the debt issue (facilitated by the IBD) than on the use of the funds received for reconstruction. For Mitch, El Salvador had received only 25% of the promised aid. For the earthquakes, the sums received may correspond to less than that. The response to the consolidated appeal launched by the UNDP is telling: less than one million dollars were received compared to the 40 million that were requested. WFP faced similar problems.
Nevertheless, NGOs, international aid organisations and certain large international institutions reacted. For some, the Mitch experience was the opportunity to capitalise their experiences, and a number of humanitarian practices were modified: non-intervention in albergues, refusal to create new urban centres, direct payment of funds to certain NGOs, etc.
4. RESULTS OF THE FIRST MISSION
4.1. The health sector
The population is undergoing an epidemiological transition, between a developing country profile and that of a newly industrialised country: homicides, lesions, suicides and chronic degenerative diseases are the main causes of mortality. The health system, which is currently undergoing reform and decentralisation, is deficient in terms of service quality, coverage, and operational capacity.
In this context, the direct impact of the earthquakes on the population's health was very concentrated in time (few deaths, no epidemics). But if the health structures, which were already overloaded before the earthquakes, were greatly used during the time of the crisis, the indirect impact due to the destruction of numerous infrastructures will be very important over the medium term.
Relatively few organisations conducted direct health interventions. The elements that determined a project's success were the quality of human resources, a good understanding of the context and close collaboration with health units.
In a first stage, the assistance allotted to the health sector consisted essentially of emergency medical equipment, field hospitals, drug donations, and support for the water supply. These actions generally covered the most urgent needs, in the short term, but they did not offer prospects for the reconstruction of the health system.
International aid organisations and NGOs concentrated most of their efforts on mental health programmes. This sector is particularly popular in the field of international co-operation, though it suffers from great methodological gaps and from an absence of capitalisation of aid workers' experiences. Though NGOs interventions in this field are legitimate during the acute phase of the emergency, to help families overcome their trauma, it may be more difficult to justify such projects five or six months after the crisis. This type of project cannot be "self-sustainable"; they risk creating a new need and overburdening further an already deficient health system. Furthermore, the structural causes of psycho-social disorders are often more linked to deplorable living conditions than to "self-esteem disorders", which call for heavy psychotherapy.
The following table summarises the principle observations and recommendations made by the mission:
|
SECTOR |
IDENTIFIED PROBLEMS OR RISKS |
ORIGINS |
RESPONSE/ SUGGESTIONS |
|
HEALTH |
Overload of local medical human resources |
« Structural poverty » of the health sector |
Long term support measures |
|
Impact of earthquakes on health structures |
Aid for reconstruction |
||
|
Mental health projects not integrated in national health system |
No mental health policy |
Discussion on the pertinence of mental health projects in developing countries
Evaluation of experiences with mental health projects in other contexts
Programme design based on the identification of needs rather than on the supply of programmes. |
|
|
Western concerns inadequately projected onto local population |
|||
|
Local teams of mental health programmes under stress themselves |
Insufficient supervision and support |
||
|
Lack of preparation |
|||
|
Health programmes inadequate in medium term compared to the basic needs of the population |
Western concerns inadequately projected onto local population |
||
|
Health programmes popular ("fashion" effect) with certain donors and NGOs |
|||
|
Lack of capitalisation of experiences in this field |
4.2. The Food and Economic security sector
This sector is particularly important because of the leverage effect it can have on the improvement of living conditions, and also because it can help reduce the migration of Salvadorians to the United States.
Agriculture faces the problem of the concentration of land ownership. The resistance of large landowners and the lack of political will have impeded agrarian reform programmes. Moreover, El Salvador has relatively little fertile land, which makes the production costs of staple products very high. Programmes for the diversification of production, which aim to favour profitable crops (cashew nuts, peppers, etc.), are confronted with the resistance of farmers and with the monopolies that control the trade networks.
The impact of the earthquakes will have been considerable, but indirect. It has less to do with the agricultural losses than with the agricultural activity itself, since the availability of labour for the harvest was reduced.
Food aid programmes have faced difficulties with monitoring due to a lack of human resources, to the difficulty of evaluating the damage in certain zones (because of a lack of community organisation), and to the partisan approach of the National Secretariat for the Family (state organisation responsible for the logistics of food distributions). The World Food Programme sub-contracted the food distribution to 4 NGOs that distributed the food aid to other organisations in the field.
The pertinence of certain projects, such as Food-for-Work (FFW), is also questioned. The FFW projects underway in rural areas during the sowing season (May, June) face difficulties when they are in competition with the livelihood activities of populations. FFW was essentially used in shelter construction, sanitation projects, and clear-up work.
Income generating activities seem to be decisive factors in the reconstruction process since they have an effect on access to shelter, and on the improvement of health, when they are carefully supervised. Though there is a consensus on the importance of giving technical and financial support to micro and small businesses, the means allotted by the international community for this purpose seem insufficient. Salvadorian NGOs that are involved in micro-credit are short of funds, even to help people who make a living from this type of activity.
|
SECTOR |
IDENTIFIED PROBLEMS OR RISKS |
ORIGIN |
RESPONSE / SUGGESTIONS |
|
FOOD AND ECONOMIC SECURITY |
Food aid dependency for certain groups |
Emergency action without consideration of the long-term |
Discussion on the notion of natural disasters and on the meaning of reconstruction |
|
Lack of integration of programmes in the local socio-economic system |
Discussion on local self-sufficiency strategies |
||
|
Lack of preparation or supervision of human resources for programming |
Specific training or increased support for programming |
||
|
Other cause ? |
Solution ? |
||
|
Overload of local capacity, particularly in FFW programmes |
Lack of knowledge on the socio-economic situation of populations |
Socio-economic studies |
|
|
Programme calendars (of implementing agency and/or donor) too rigid |
Flexibility in calendar, negotiation with donors |
||
|
Other cause ? |
Solution ? |
||
|
Drain of resources of the sector towards shelter reconstruction |
Wrong perception of priorities and sector analysis |
Consideration of the need for economic and agricultural development programmes in an integrated approach to reconstruction |
|
|
« visual effect » of the needs for reconstruction |
Idem |
||
|
Availability of international funds for reconstruction |
Idem, on the part of the donors |
||
|
Other cause ? |
Solution ? |
||
|
Other problem ? |
|
4.3. The Shelter sector
The issue of shelter, or more particularly housing, suddenly became the main concern of agencies that had never worked on this question before. The problem of shelter had already been looming for years in this country. The civil war and the tropical storm Mitch have only worsened the existing housing shortage and "favelisation" in El Salvador.
Part of the aid community thus fell in the trap of targeting the most visible problem, and gave in to the opportunism prompted by the large sums this type of disaster can attract. The most visible aspects were addressed, often in haste, without considering the structural causes. Some NGOs did not wish to stay behind the general movement focused on shelter, and, instead of sticking to their usual field of activity, got involved in heavy housing reconstruction programmes. A large number of NGOs committed themselves to the reconstruction of all types of housing, without thinking ahead about the process through which "human settlements" are built, can function, and can be integrated in an urban framework and socio-economic dynamic.
Yet, the role of "facilitators" on the question of shelter is important. The modes of intervention in shelter are very diverse. But construction activities were favoured over types of assistance that strengthen local communities' capacity.
Four types of strategies:
|
The building of temporary housing, with no follow-up |
This type of intervention is more often carried out by large government agencies (FISDL, supported by the El Salvador Armed Forces), international NGOs or large international institutions. They are generally not specialised in the issue of shelter. Using a purely emergency-oriented logic, hundreds of thousands of corrugated iron huts (champas) of 10 to 25 m2 were built at an expensive price (over 300 $US per "housing unit"). These huts, often built two to four months after the disaster illustrate the incapability of agencies to tackle the complex issue of shelter. However, differences in the approach used by some agencies made it possible to cover different populations (e.g. property owners and tenants). The latter were both the most vulnerable group and the least supported by aid organisations. |
|
Temporary housing, with follow-up |
Some international aid agencies and NGOs became aware of the importance of access to basic services and to decent housing. Through partnerships, a number of follow-up/support measures were initiated. The possible solutions are several: -Support to economic activities. -Micro-credit for the improvement of shelter. -Programme for access to basic services. -Rehabilitation (regularisation of land ownership, access to services, technical/financial supervision). -Mediation with landowners, to avoid the brutal eviction of families during a set length of time. -Donation of dismantable houses for the most vulnerable groups (tenants, colonos, jomaleros) in terms of land ownership. |
|
Progressive housing |
This relatively innovative solution is interesting in that it is based on the notion of housing as a process born out of thought and culture, and not as an industrial product. This type of response, however, more than the other solutions, requires very close and continuous support. |
|
Permanent housing |
The use of certain types of materials has centred the debate on the reconstruction of permanent housing. There also, the responses are often founded on what is visible, i.e. the destruction of adobe houses. A large majority of agencies thus failed to look for the origin of the destruction (lack of maintenance, loss of traditional know-how, lack of information on high risk zones, socio-economic vulnerability, etc.) and chose the breeze block option, sometimes, going against cultural systems in rural areas. This choice of materials also raises the problem of recurrent construction costs (around 50% for the materials, 30% for the transport, and 20% for labour). In the light of the huge current housing deficit, it is necessary to propose models which can be more widely disseminated, and through which it is possible to increase the number of beneficiaries in communities while facilitating their empowerment. Given the high logistic costs, in materials, and the low learning involved in breeze block constructions, this strategy, though used by the majority of agencies, will not solve the housing deficit. |
The quality of programmes is very variable, and depends on the level of reflection on the concept of housing, on the degree of participation, and on the partnerships put in place. We are thus witnessing a levelling down of housing quality in El Salvador. Though far from the Salvadorian culture, the basic model, of the champa type, is apparently being irreversibly imposed as the model of popular housing in El Salvador, after the last disaster.
Three types of project management
|
Direct management |
This type of management is often linked to an emergency-oriented approach to aid. Organisations want to keep the control over the process, even if it means learning about shelter from scratch. The results of this type of approach are sometimes worrying, and they risk causing other problems in the medium term (huts abandoned, destruction in case of disaster, social problems in zones where champas are concentrated, etc.) |
|
Delegated management |
NGOs and international aid organisations, that are aware of the complexity of a shelter project, or which lack skilled human resources, prefer to delegate the project implementation to specialised, often local, companies, which are aware of the social and organisational problems this type of projects can face. |
|
Shared management |
Sometimes designated as a "consortium", this type of management brings together several NGOs who use their respective fields of expertise for the benefit of a project that integrates the different technical dimensions of shelter (social engineering, development of beneficiaries' productive capacity, etc.). Partnerships in the form of consortiums prevent one or more agencies from being distinguished, in terms of public image, from the others. Integrating a Salvadorian NGO in this type of consortium reinforces the team's knowledge of the context and increases the chances of the project being disseminated. |
Two reconstruction models
|
Housing reconstruction in situ |
Often promoted by large institutions, this approach has the advantage of enabling the victims of a disaster to stay in their socio-economic environment. Many families indeed prefer to stay. However, it seems irresponsible to re-house people in high risk zones, which are, moreover, known and listed by the Salvadorian Ministry of the Environment. |
|
The creation of new human settlements |
An indirect effect of the fall in coffee market prices is that much land has been made available for the construction of new urban zones. This option makes it possible to rationalise the use of land and meet construction needs. The creation of new colonia requires in-depth preliminary studies, which take into consideration the installation of structuring equipment, access to an employment pool, and access to basic services. Construction done in haste rarely makes this type of approach possible. Even more worrying, many victims must become indebted (often in the form of a credit over 10 to 15 years) to buy a parcel of land or to create a colonia (term applied to an urban quarter) in rural zones, an operation which goes against the local cultural and environmental system. |
The following table summarises the main observations and recommendations.
|
SECTOR |
IDENTIFIED PROBLEMS OR RISKS |
ORIGIN |
RESPONSE/ PROPOSITIONS |
|
SHELTER |
Risk of transforming temporary housing in poor-quality permanent housing |
Programming of an emergency intervention with no follow-up |
Strengthening of programming capacity + work in partnership Rehabilitation (services, legislation) |
|
Vision of the product and not of the process |
Awareness that shelter is not a goal in itself |
||
|
Pressure from donors (act fast) |
« education », lobby or strengthening of arguments |
||
|
Identity of emergency NGOs |
Discussion at the institutional level and/or partnership with local NGOs |
||
|
Lack of financial resources |
Micro-credit Support to income generation activities |
||
|
Other origin? |
Solution ? |
||
|
Reconstruction of temporary housing « in situ », in high risk zones |
Emergency programming (give one a roof) without thinking about factors of vulnerability |
Strengthening of programming capacity |
|
|
Problem of access to land ownership |
Solution ? |
||
|
Pressure from donors (act fast) |
« education », lobby or strengthening of arguments |
||
|
Other origin? |
Solution ? |
||
|
Heterogeneity of constructions or of processes on a same site (which can lead to tensions between families) |
Rigidity of each organisation's criteria |
Discussion at the institutional level on criteria |
|
|
Co-ordination seen as a constraint |
Discussion at the institutional level on co-ordination |
||
|
Weakness of the local authorities for the imposition of criteria |
? |
||
|
Other origin ? |
Solution ? |
||
|
No reproducibility or diffusion of projects (too expensive) and thus poor coverage of needs |
External know-how and materials (breeze blocks) must be brought in |
Training Methodological support |
|
|
Psychological rejection of adobe (by fear, or because it is an external sign of social class) |
Sensitisation work with communities |
||
|
Other origin? |
Solution ? |
||
|
Indebtedness through credit systems for housing (or for land acquisition) |
Socio-economic studies done too hastily |
Strengthening of the capacity to understand contexts |
|
|
Lack of reflection on the problems |
Negotiations with land owners Dismantable homes |
||
|
Other origin? |
Solution ? |
||
|
Overload of local capacities (e.g. labour for construction needed during planting season) |
Lack of knowledge on the contexts and social reality |
Strengthening of the capacity for diagnosis and search for information |
|
|
Other origin? |
Solution ? |
||
|
? |
? |
||
|
New asentamientos (settlements) not integrated |
No discussion on the questions of urban planning |
Consultation with local NGOs Socio-economic studies |
|
|
Land ownership and political problems |
Negotiation and technical support for town councils |
||
|
Privatisation of services |
Participatory work focused on self-management |
4.4. Transversal analysis
The transversal analysis of the different sectors shows that the following issues are still insufficiently addressed in emergency interventions: understanding of contexts (including the analysis of structural vulnerability), partnerships with local actors, inter-agency co-operation, and strategies favouring sustainability (including the participation of concerned populations).
Community participation, the leitmotiv of each project, is a "carryall" term with no real meaning. Participation is often considered by agencies as a means to reduce projects' recurrent costs, by using victims as cheap, unskilled labour. There is no real learning and organisational process around a project. Furthermore, the "community" is often viewed, with a certain idealism, as a homogeneous entity or group capable of coming together for any reason. One often forgets that a community is an extremely complex social and economic structure, composed of conflicting individuals and interests. The integration of social sciences in the identification and implementation of interventions could be a way to improve the participation and organisation of social groups.
Collaboration between international aid organisations and Salvadorian NGOs is often lacking. Yet they are truly complementary. Partnership experiences are nevertheless rare.
Four types of partnerships are generally initiated:
|
Financial support |
During the emergency, some Salvadorian NGOs had the financial or material support to distribute goods to the victims. Unfortunately, there was no support in human resources to accomplish certain tasks, such that the staff was overloaded with work, and this led to sometimes serious problems (health, etc.). The participation of groups of beneficiaries was often essential to ensure the distribution. Positions for logisticians and administrators should be planned to avoid such overloads in times of acute crisis. |
|
Co-ordination /mediation : |
An international aid organisation can serve as a facilitator for local NGOs. This approach is interesting in that it concentrates on a precise and limited geographical zone in order to avoid efforts being too widely dispersed. |
|
Consortium : |
see part on Shelter |
|
Support to the local authorities for project supervision |
Many operators neglect the importance of local communities. Yet, they have considerable skills and often lay claim to the role of aid co-ordinator. Town councils that received support and advice from Salvadorian NGOs specialised in development issues thus avoided many errors. |
5. CONCLUSION
In the light of this first mission in El Salvador, the debate on the need to modify humanitarian practices and to use new tools in emergencies remains topical. Meanwhile, the issue of the link between emergency and development also emerged. The next mission, and the co-ordination and sharing processes that will go with it, should enable us to go further. The fact that the team will carry out an evaluation "Mitch + 3 years" in Nicaragua and Honduras before going to El Salvador for the second mission of iterative evaluations with mini-seminars should further enrich the debates.
ITERATIVE EVALUATIONS WITH MINI-SEMINARS, MITCH + 3 YEARS, EL SALVADOR AFTER THE 2001 EARTHQUAKES, SUMMARY OF THE 2ND MISSION REPORT
1. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
October 1998
: Hurricane Mitch hits Central America. Nicaragua and Honduras are severely struck. NGOs, among others, invest in the support and implementation of emergency assistance and reconstruction programmes, using the abundant public and private funds. The majority of the funds managed by NGOs are invested in shelter reconstruction.August 1999 : A first evaluation mission carried out in August 1999 draws a first set of teachings and proposes a number of hypotheses to be verified at a later date. A first series of mini-seminars are organised in Managua. The latter are followed by several restitution exercises in France, in particular through workshops during which the results of the mission and their implications for NGOs are discussed.
January / February 2001 : Already affected by a decade of civil war and by Hurricane Mitch, El Salvador is devastated by a series of earthquakes which affect both rural and urban zones. Aid is rapidly mobilised, but in a relatively limited way, since there is competition with another natural disaster: the earthquake in Gujarât.
June 2001: A first multidisciplinary evaluation mission undertaken by the URD Group analyses the interventions, and organises a first series of feedback meetings in the field and upon their return in Europe. The report in French and Spanish, and a summary in English, are widely circulated, including through the URD Group website
www.urd.orgSeptember 2001
: What had become, three years later, of the numerous post-Mitch shelter reconstruction programmes that had been implemented by NGOs in Nicaragua and Honduras in 1999? How were these same humanitarian actors going to address the present shelter reconstruction issue in El Salvador, which had been seriously affected by the earthquakes at the beginning of the year? The Quality Project team returned to Nicaragua and Honduras on the sites it had visited in 1999, in the first phase of the capitalisation work on "Mitch + 3 years". The team then transmitted their conclusions to the actors of the reconstruction in El Salvador, through a workshop organised in San Salvador at the end of September 2001. Groupe URD's multidisciplinary team carried out evaluation work in the field, through direct observations, surveys with ex-beneficiaries or others, informal and formal discussions. The analysis was structured around 3 technical sectors (shelter, food and economic security, and social services -health, education…) and 4 transversal issues (link between Emergency and Development, risk prevention, transition to cost recovery, and population displacements). The exercise aims to understand "what worked, why, and how?" and "what did not work, why, and how?" in order to draw lessons on the Quality of interventions and to disseminate these in El Salvador today. In addition to these evaluation activities, 3 young researchers were based in the zone (one in Nicaragua on a series of case studies, and 2 in El Salvador, including one who is carrying out a mini social audit).
2. PRESENTATION OF RESULTS
The results of the reconstruction projects in Nicaragua and Honduras, 3 years after Hurricane Mitch, seem mixed. The hypotheses raised in 1999 were largely confirmed:
The variability in the level of success can be explained by different internal and external elements, technical or not.
In El Salvador, 8 months after the earthquakes, already a few problems or risks appear, which can be explained at different levels. Most hypotheses elaborated in the June 2001 mission (first mission in the iterative evaluation with mini-seminars process) were confirmed in the second mission.
The following table presents an empirical analysis done in several steps. It uses a sample of the field observations by listing the main themes observed and attempts to explain their cause at two different levels, in order to deduce principles for action and tools for the improvement of the quality of interventions.
Summary table of the main results
|
Observations |
Type of problems |
Origin? |
Thoughts and suggestions |
|
Mitch+3 years :
Desertion of sites, abandonment or sale of houses |
Access to employment market difficult, costly, or impossible |
Population displacement Distances too big Constraint of access to land ownership |
Maximum limitation of population displacements Discussion on risk control Importance of political lobbying |
|
Recurrent costs (water, electricity, maintenance, etc.) too high |
Lack of reflection or of knowledge on local capacities
|
Importance of doing fine diagnoses and socio-economic studies from the outstart of programming Partnerships with local structures Flexibility of donors to facilitate such assessments |
|
|
Unadapted way of life (e.g. farmers relocated in grouped housing) |
Lack of reflection or knowledge on local socio-cultural realities Constraint of access to land ownership Population displacement |
Importance of doing fine diagnoses and socio-economic studies Importance of political lobbying Maximum limitation of population displacement |
|
|
Insecurity in terms of land ownership and legal status (no property title for the house or land parcel) |
Constraint of access to land ownership Political problems |
Importance of political lobbying
|
|
|
No economic activity developed by emergency agencies |
Neglect of the importance of economic security Lack of experience Intervention period imposed by donors too short and rigid |
Develop links with local actors Create consortiums between emergency and development actors Implementation of a transition fund between emergency and development budgets. |
|
|
El Salvador + 8 months :
Mode of beneficiary selection leading to a neglect of the most vulnerable population groups |
Limited resources compared to the scale of needs |
Low media coverage (c.f. Gujharat) |
Importance of the discussion on cost-effectiveness for the reproducibility of projects with few resources |
|
Criteria of land ownership imposed by humanitarian agencies |
Following the land ownership problems faced after Mitch, agencies chose an option to avoid these difficulties |
Importance of going back to agencies' mandate in the discussion on quality (do well, yes, but for whom?) |
|
|
Difficulty of working with the poorest groups |
Low level of organisation of communities |
Importance of long-term follow-up and support to population groups |
|
|
Risk of transforming temporary construction into poor permanent housing |
Emergency programming with no follow-up |
Perception of housing reconstruction as an emergency action Identity of emergency NGOs Availability and timing of funds |
Strengthening of programming capacities Discussion at the institutional level on the meaning of emergency and of reconstruction Work in partnership with local structures |
|
Vision of the product and not of the process |
Lack of reflection or of knowledge of existing work on shelter |
Awareness that a house is not an objective in itself Human resources policy (recruitment and/or training) |
|
|
Pressure of donors (act fast) |
Political and institutional constraints of donors |
« donor education », strengthening of arguments |
From this table, different levels of analysis on the quality of humanitarian action appear. The determining factors can be external or internal to the organisation. Some are linked to the context, others have a wider scope :
We note here that the quality of programmes is partly related to the tools used, but also to a number of external factors and ingredients which cannot necessarily be translated into tools: general and professional ethics, cultural references, etc.
A house reconstruction programme will thus be different according to how one views housing: is it only a roof, or is it the result of a complex process which integrates social, cultural, and economic aspects?
This approach to housing implies:
3. ANALYSIS OF THE METHOD
It appears clearly that, in a learning perspective, the method of iterative evaluations with mini-seminars has considerable potential, including an interesting cost-effectiveness ratio. On the other hand, the current test has highlighted considerable margins for improvements, especially in the following:
Too much confidence was granted to the internet liaison between both international and national actors. The lists of addresses were sometimes incomplete, or contained errors. The lack of time for the preparation of the second feedback meeting in the field led to a certain frustration among actors, who had not received the first mission report, or who received the invitation for the second mini-seminar too late. These errors should be avoided in future missions.
The advisory part of these evaluations works well when sufficient time is granted to bilateral discussions. On the other hand, it can be feared that the lack of flexibility of programmes and donors makes it difficult to implement the changes recommended by the evaluation.
Whereas the mission in 1999 arrived in the field 8 months after Mitch, the fist mission in El Salvador using the method of "iterative evaluations with mini-seminars" took place 4 months after the earthquakes. It seems that it is necessary to arrive even sooner. This will be done for the next test, which should be on the Afghan crisis (mission planned for December if the funding is mobilised on time).
4. CONCLUSIONS: OPTIONS FOR THE QUALITY PROJECT
Before proposing practical solutions (methods, tools, recipes), it is necessary to better understand the origins of the problems with the Quality of Humanitarian Action, through a holistic approach which places humanitarian actors in an environment which partly determines the quality of their actions (relations with public and private donors, local actors, political and budgetary constraints). The issue is not to clear humanitarian actors of their share of responsibilities, but to have a global and holistic approach to the problem.
Furthermore, this environment is dynamic. The technical level is not the only level of action that needs to be considered (c.f. political lobbying, from the micro to the macro level). A small structure that concentrates all its means on negotiations to obtain a small plot of land for farmers may achieve better work than a large NGO that builds many houses, in line with quality standards, but which will be deserted because economic and land ownership issues were not taken into consideration.